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Angola’s difficulties in achieving macro-economic stability and economic liberalization
have serious implications for private-sector development. Hyperinflation, and frequent
policy reversal, constrain and distort investment in both the informal and formal parts of
the private sector. But macro-economic instability arises in part out of mechanisms that
subsidize powerful oligopolies, enabling them to capture a portion of the large oil rents.
These subsidies, together with market controls, enable the oligopolies to profit at the
expense of small- and micro-enterprises, thereby hindering the creation of more
employment for Angola’s poor. Therefore the new private sector that is evolving in
Angola owes its character to three factors: the course of the war; the country’s natural
resource windfall; and the way in which liberalization and privatization have been
pursued.
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1 Introduction
Angola has suffered conflict for over thirty years: a bloody struggle for independence
was followed by recurring civil war. The contest for Angola’s natural resource wealth is
central to the conflict and to the seemingly impossible task of establishing peace (see
Addison 2001b and Le Billon 1999). The war has devastated the country, shattered
communities, and caused immense human suffering: community reconstruction is
urgent (see Adauta et al. 2001). But in addition to achieving peace and reconstruction,
Angola needs to complete its economic transition. Successive reform programmes have
repeatedly broken down, and economic management has been chaotic. In part this
reflects the strength of reform’s opponents—many of whom personally benefit from
market controls. However, it also reflects the macro-economic challenges involved in
managing the country’s vast and growing oil wealth.
Angola’s difficulties in achieving macro-economic stability and economic liberalization
have serious implications for private-sector development. Hyperinflation, and frequent
policy reversal, constrain and distort investment in both the informal and formal parts of
the private sector. But macro-economic instability arises in part out of mechanisms that
subsidize powerful oligopolies, enabling them to capture a portion of the large oil rents.
These subsidies, together with market controls, enable the oligopolies to profit at the
expense of small- and micro-enterprises, thereby hindering the creation of more
employment for Angola’s poor. Therefore the new private sector that is evolving in
Angola owes its character to three factors: the course of the war; the country’s natural
resource windfall; and the way in which liberalization and privatization have been
pursued. This paper mainly focuses on the last of these forces, whereas Le Billon (1999)
discusses the first two.
We begin, in section 2 with a brief overview of Angola’s economy and the country’s
economic transition. The reasons for the repeated breakdown of reform programmes are
highlighted. Section 3 discusses the roots of macro-economic disequilibrium, and their
origin in the power of vested interests. We show how mechanisms involved in the
distribution of the oil rents lead to a budget trap, which in turn creates high inflation and
undermines economic transition. Section 3 also discusses the difficulties encountered in
financial reform, including the creation of a private banking system. Section 4 discusses
the implications for private-sector development, and the power of the oligopolies.
Section 5 concludes by contrasting the interaction of economic reform and war in
Angola and Mozambique. Therefore the paper forms a bridge between issues of private-
sector development and issues of the state. The analysis shows that private-sector
development in Angola is intimately related to the dynamics of the state itself, in
particular the interests of powerful actors who straddle both the private sector and the
government.
Before we begin our analysis, a word or two of caution is appropriate. First, information
is scarce. Indeed, ‘non-transparency’ has been a feature of the state’s operations and its
relationship with private actors. Hence, any study of Angola must be an ‘exercise in
scepticism’—there is little that is entirely indisputable (Wheeler and Pélissier 1971).1
Second, at the present time (September 2000) Angola remains at war. How that war
1 Useful statistical sources for Angola include those of the National Institute of Statistics (INE 1996,
1997a and 1997b), as well as the IMF (1997, 1999) and UNDP (1997).2
evolves—and whether peace can be achieved in the immediate future—will inevitably
affect some of the conclusions of this analysis.
2 Angola’s economy in transition
When the Portuguese withdrew from Angola in November 1975, they left a country rich
in potential—colonial investment had focused on natural resources and agriculture—but
poor in institutional structures and human capital.2 For the MPLA, Marxism-Leninism
appeared to provide the key to rapidly overcoming underdevelopment and the party
officially adopted the ideology in 1976. The influence of Marxism-Leninism was further
strengthened by the close political relationship that developed with the Eastern Bloc
countries, a consequence of the decisive role of Soviet assistance and Cuban forces in
defending the MPLA against UNITA and South Africa (MacQueen 1997). Therefore,
the Soviet model of central planning inspired the new government to enforce wide-
ranging price controls, to fix the exchange rate, and to nationalize large- and small-
private enterprises together with land and the financial system (Aguilar and Zejan
1993). Moreover, Portuguese settlers—who abandoned their property in the mass
exodus from the country—had owned most of the colonial private sector. Therefore
nationalization was practically the only means for the new government to maintain
economic activity and prevent an employment collapse (also the situation in
Mozambique—see Castel-Branco et al. 2001).
The attempt to create a centrally planned economy was doomed by the state’s lack of
institutional capacity and skills together with the ongoing war with UNITA which
increasingly disrupted agriculture and trade. Moreover, since prices were frozen at mid-
1970s levels, extensive rationing evolved, leading to the growth of parallel market
activity from which state functionaries derived considerable personal profit (by 1990
parallel-market prices were twenty to forty times higher than in the formal market). As
inflation accelerated, so barter became increasingly important in economic activity. As
the economy contracted, so the tax base declined, putting pressure on the fiscal deficit
that was then monetized, thereby creating fresh inflation. A severe balance of payments
deficit also resulted from the collapse of exports—the result of the real exchange rate’s
appreciation—which further intensified foreign exchange rationing, and the growth of
rationing in goods markets (with associated rent-seeking). Although oil output increased
with foreign investment, the decline in oil prices and the contraction of agriculture
meant that by 1987 GDP was around half its 1974 level (Aguilar and Zejan 1993).
By the mid-1980s, the MPLA was actively debating the desirability of economic
reform. Aside from the economy’s decline, developments in the Soviet Union
encouraged more internal debate (Webber 1992). In addition, elements within the party
and the government believed that some aspects of reform (for example privatization)
offered more scope for personal wealth accumulation. Accordingly, the MPLA’s second
party congress in 1987 decided to initiate economic transition. The Programa de
2 Large-scale Portuguese immigration to Angola meant that settlers held most of the formal-sector jobs,
including some of the most menial. In general Portugal’s ex-colonies inherited weaker institutional
structures and lower stocks of human capital than most other SSA countries (see Kovsted and Tarp
1999 on Guinea-Bissau as well).3
Saneamento Económico e Financeiro (SEF) was launched in 1987, with major measures
announced in 1989, but aside from preparations to join the IMF and the World Bank,
reform did not progress—privatization stalled for example. Implementation was
entrusted to a special secretariat but opposition within the party and the state
bureaucracy quickly paralysed their efforts. Major reforms such as devaluation were
shelved, and by the end of the 1980s the economy was still in dire shape (Aguilar and
Zejan 1993). In particular, external debt (including that owed to the Soviet Union) had
grown enormously.
2.1 Economic reform in the 1990s
Marxism-Leninism was abandoned by the MPLA at its third party congress in 1990, and
the 1991 constitutional revisions introduced a multi-party system. Political liberalization
thereby set the scene for restarting economic transition. Prompted by a deteriorating
financial situation, the government embarked on its most serious attempt to reform the
economy. Under the Programa de Acção do Governo (PAG) the kwanza was devalued
in 1991. This initially corrected the currency’s overvaluation, but failure to reign in the
fiscal deficit—which was above 20 per cent of GDP in 1991 and went above 50 per cent
in 1992 (Figure 1)—and its monetization meant that inflation (which rose from 160 per
cent in 1991 to 246 per cent in 1992) quickly eroded much of the gain in
competitiveness resulting from the devaluation (Figure 2). After the 1991 Bicesse
Accords (which resulted in the suspension of hostilities until late 1992), reform began
again. Technocrats in the Ministry of Finance and the central bank, Banco Nacional de
Angola (BNA), pushed for exchange-rate reform to replace the non-transparent
administrative mechanisms for allocating foreign exchange. The first foreign exchange
auction (a measure successfully used elsewhere in SSA to correct overvaluation) was
held in 1993 (for details see Aguilar 1992, Aguilar and Stenman 1993, 1994).
Some prices were liberalized although administrative control was retained over the
prices of utilities and petrol. Small shops were quickly set up to take advantage of this
liberalization. However, the supply response was otherwise weakened by unresolved
problems in ownership rights, including land ownership and the economy slumped
(Figure 3). Limited privatization accompanied the partial price-liberalization, and a
number of small- and medium-sized enterprises were transferred to private ownership in
a non-transparent process that largely benefited people in the party and the government
(see section 4).
A currency reform in which new notes were issued was also undertaken. In the ensuing
confusion, many people were unable to convert their old money and the reform
effectively destroyed much of the country’s savings. The government made vague
promises of future restitution, but these were worthless given an inflation rate that rose
to 1,236 per cent in 1993). The government has never clearly explained why it
implemented currency reform in this way. One explanation is that the government
feared a sharp rise in inflation after the price liberalization. By confiscating cash
balances and savings, the currency reform sharply reduced aggregate demand and
thereby curbed inflation (although only temporarily given the failure to reduce the fiscal
deficit and its monetization). Both the problem and its ‘solution’ are quite similar to
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The resulting unrest and the resumption of war in late 1992 favoured reform’s
opponents—the auction system was abandoned and the currency was revalued—and the
finance minister and central bank governor were sacked.3 After a period of policy drift
and continued economic decline, technocrats temporarily gained the upper hand with a
new set of reforms in the Programa Económico e Social para 1994 (PES 94 succeeded
by PES 95-96 ) (GOA 1994, 1995). The signing of the Lusaka Protocol in November
1994 and the end of the so-called ‘third war’ favoured reformers.4 The official exchange
rate was devalued in stages (Table 1) resulting in a substantial narrowing of the gap
between the official and parallel rates and in 1995 agreement was reached on an IMF
‘shadow’ programme (under which the Fund would monitor progress on key policy
changes but without committing resources). This appeared to mark a significant policy
shift (Aguilar and Stenman 1995). But the Achilles heel of Angolan economic
management—control of the fiscal deficit—undermined reform yet again.
Hyperinflation reached 5,421 per cent in 1996. Conservatives gained ascendancy in the
new government and the resulting Vida Nova (New Life) programme of 1996 sharply
3 On the breakdown of the peace and the return to war see Brittan (1998), Le Billon (1999), and
Tvedten (1997).
4 For further discussion of events and policy changes during this period see Aguilar (1995), Aguilar and
Stenman (1993, 1994) da Rocha (1996), and McCormick (1994).5
reversed the PES: the exchange rate was fixed, and many administrative controls were
reintroduced (Aguilar and Stenman 1996).5
Not surprisingly, Vida Nova proved to be fruitless and liberalization restarted in early
1998 (under the Programa de Estabilização e Recuperação Económica de Médio
Prazo). The currency was devalued in steps and negotiations with the IMF restarted.
However, the collapse in the world price of oil over 1997-98 sharply reduced public
revenues thereby undermining control of the fiscal deficit (see Figure 1) and the
contraction in foreign exchange reserves left little scope for defending the fixed
exchange rate or supporting a stepped devaluation. So, in May 1999 the currency
floated. This took place against a background of increasing fighting, and the eventual
return to all-out war.
In summary, early macro-reform was marked by incorrect policy-sequencing—
devaluation but no supporting monetary and fiscal restraint—and botched currency
reform with often chaotic policy shifts (in turn interacting with the war). The average
Angolan therefore suffered the worst of both worlds: a large price shock but no
compensating improvement in growth and employment. People lost confidence in the
currency and in the nascent financial system, including the newly created central bank.
Inflation fell towards the end of the 1990s but growth—with the exception of offshore
oil—has remained low and constrained by the uncertain periods of peace and,
eventually, the return of war.
Angola’s experience with transition revealed a number of problems common to
transitions elsewhere, including those in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union
(EE-FSU) as well as Vietnam. First, there was no clear border between the state and the
party. This resulted in erratic decision-making that made the task of implementing the
plan—a very difficult job in the best of times—totally impossible. Therefore it became
very difficult for technocrats to control the economy using their planning mechanisms
while simultaneously introducing gradual liberalization. Second, it became clear that
many institutions critical for the efficient operation of markets simply did not exist. The
financial system was unable to offer even the minimal financial services necessary to a
market economy (see section 3) and there were no mechanisms capable of regulating
the liberalized economy in the public interest. The legal framework was totally
inadequate and contract-enforcement was weak, a problem shared by many of Africa’s
transition economies. The country lacked the resources and skills necessary to set up the
necessary institutions—a problem that remains to this day. Many of these difficulties
parallel those found in the EE-FSU transitions, especially the lack of an appropriate
institutional framework, which is a pre-condition for markets to operate efficiently
(North 1997, Stiglitz 1998).
5 Relevant government documents covering this period include GOA (1997a, 1997b, 1997c and 1997d).6
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Table 1
Angola: exchange rate trends
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
(estimate)
Official exchange rate
(dollar terms, end of period)
6.5 509 5,692 201,994 262,376
Nominal effective exchange rate
(annual percentage change)
624.3 913.0 3,729.7 2,238.1 618.6
Real effective exchange rate
(annual percentage change,
increase = appreciation)
65.5 -86.8 216.3 -51.1 100.00
Source: IMF (1999).
3 Macroeconomic disequilibrium and its causes
The Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of Finance, and BNA are formally in charge of
designing and implementing economic policy. But all three are institutionally weak and,
despite donor efforts in capacity building, short of professional staff capable of
collecting data and formulating economic policy. The skill shortage is partly due to the
collapse in real wages in the public-sector. Yet, although both Eritrea and Mozambique
suffer from similar skill shortages, their governments are better at using the professional
staff that is available (on Eritrea see Hansson 2001). In contrast, professional skills are
not effectively used in the Angolan state, the division of responsibilities is unclear (and
shifts frequently depending on the political situation), and co-operation within and
between government agencies is poor. High levels of uncertainty together with
corruption have undermined the creation and deployment of institutional capital, and
Angola is very far from having a ‘development state’ of the kind defined by Addison (in
2001a).
Furthermore, many decisions are taken by a council of advisors at the presidency known
informally as the Homens de Futungo (‘group at Futungo’) named after the site of the
presidential palace, Futungo das Belas. This group reports directly to the president,
bypassing the three institutions formally responsible for economic management, and
often reversing their decisions. As a result, ministries are very cautious in making policy
(thereby slowing the process even further) and the private sector has little confidence in
measures that are not openly supported by the president and his advisors.
Angolan policy making can best be described as following a cycle of activity, passivity
and crisis. Every year, often in March, the government presents a new programme, often
initiated after some crisis sparks criticism by the president. Until 1993, these
programmes were often rich in philosophical reflection but thin on concrete measures or
data. The technical quality of the programmes improved with the PES—the result of
donor capacity-building in the core ministries—but policy recommendations are most
often vague or inconsistent. Eventually, after much delay, the programme is approved.8
This is especially serious for the public investment programme run by the Ministry of
Planning. A long list of projects is presented with little regard to their feasibility,
finance or social value. Ministries put forward projects with almost no screening by the
Ministry of Planning, and social cost-benefit analysis is not used. Political influence
rather than economic rationality drives implementation. The group at Futungo
frequently imposes decisions that contradict the programme’s orientation. Of the few
projects that are eventually executed, most have very low social returns and high-return
projects—such as investment in basic social infrastructure—languish on the shelf (one
reason for the collapse in social spending). The programme is usually abandoned by the
middle of the year, and policy-making becomes paralysed. The year ends with a deep
financial crisis and fresh criticism by the president. The cycle then restarts.
This cycle also affects relations with the IMF and the World Bank for, as discussed in
section 2, the government and the IMF engage in periodic discussions, the former
declaring its interest in co-operation, but policy changes frequently contradict Article IV
Consultations, and relations with the Fund then cool. The group at Futungo has been
openly opposed to an IMF deal. Although there are certainly legitimate concerns
regarding IMF programmes—the results in SSA countries have often been meagre—
opposition also arises because some aspects of reform would reduce the income of the
country’s elite. For example, the state elite often argues that the market, if left to itself,
will import too many luxury goods such as cars, and too few basic goods such as food.
In fact under the dual exchange-rate system, most luxury cars were imported with
foreign currency obtained at the official exchange rate and food was most often
imported using foreign currency obtained at the more expensive parallel market rate.
Therefore, in contrast to Mozambique—where successive IMF programmes have been
implemented—Angola has never received an IMF adjustment credit. Indeed, Angola is
almost unique among transition countries (both in Africa and elsewhere) in its limited
borrowing from the Fund (another shadow programme was announced in early 2000,
but as yet there is no IMF lending programme).
Clearly the continuation of war limits private investment and broad-based growth. But
the limited credibility of economic management further constrains private investment in
sectors in which returns are long-term (manufacturing and agriculture especially) and
for which the costs of policy-reversal to investors are therefore high. As a result, private
investment remains distorted towards sectors in which returns are immediate (retail
trade especially) and in which political interests provide some protection for investors
(see Addison 1998, for further discussion of this point).
3.1 Oil rents
The oil sector became the main source of foreign-exchange earnings as agriculture and
industry declined. Much of the oil is offshore and is therefore largely safe from war.
The state-owned company, SONANGOL, which has the sole concession for oil
exploration and production, dominates the oil industry. SONANGOL operates by means
of joint ventures and production sharing agreements with foreign partners.
Transnational oil companies such as Chevron and Elf constitute the largest private-
sector operations in Angola; foreign investment in the oil sector is between US$ 8
billion and US$ 10 billion and Angola is now Africa’s largest oil producer after Nigeria
(Le Billon 1999).9
Although the war played a large part in undermining the non-oil tradable sectors
(agricultural output is probably less than 5 per cent of its pre-war level), the Dutch
Disease effects associated with Angola’s oil boom also played their part. The
overvalued currency (discussed in section 2) shifted production incentives away from
the tradable sectors—agriculture in particular—and in favour of non-tradable activities,
including commerce. The oil sector took much of the economy’s scarce skilled labour.
The extensive system of price and import controls adopted after independence has
further encouraged rent seeking (a non-tradable activity). Hence, the macro-economic
effects of the oil windfall have added to the contractionary effects of the war,
particularly on the agricultural sector. Agriculture’s decline began to reverse in the mid
1990s as devaluation made domestic agriculture more competitive vis-à-vis imports, but
the real value of output by the end of the decade was still only 64 per cent of its level at
the start of the 1990s and will not recover until peace is established (see Table 2).
Understanding how the oil rents are distributed and their role in the budget is critical to
understanding the macroeconomics of Angola and, indeed, Angolan society in general.
In addition to corruption and straightforward grabbing, the rents are distributed in two
main ways. The first mechanism is the system of budget subsidies to both private and
state enterprises. These are intended to cheapen the cost to consumers of basic goods
and public services (such as utilities) but, given the unavailability of basic goods in rural
areas and the very limited coverage of public services, the non-poor capture most of the
benefits. Moreover, senior civil servants receive direct benefits including petrol and
housing allowances, car-purchase subsidies, and subsidized health care. The subsidy
system is a major contributor to the large fiscal deficit, it does very little to address
Angola’s deep poverty problem and it perpetuates Angola’s high-income inequality
(Adauta et al. 2001 report a Gini coefficient of 0.62 for urban income inequality).
Second, the dual exchange-rate system, which existed until May 1999, overvalued the
currency. Foreign exchange earnings (oil being the largest source) are distributed by the
state in a non-transparent manner; until 1999 recipients received foreign exchange at
the official (overvalued) rate which could then be sold at the parallel market rate—
thereby profiting from the large spread between official and market rates. During the
period 1992-98, the parallel-market exchange rate was on average 2.9 times higher than
Table 2
Angola: agricultural sector
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Agricultural GDP
growth rate
- 1.3 - 27.3 - 46.7 9.9 26.5 15.3 9.7 5.0 - 10.1
Food production
index (1989 = 100)




721 524 279 307 388 447 490 515 463
Agriculture as
percentage of GDP
24.0 10.1 11.6 6.6 7.7 7.3 9.5 12.3
Note: 1999 data are estimates.
Source: World Bank (2000c).10
the official rate (Gelbard and Nagayasu 1999: 3). This explains why influential groups
were able to block unification of the exchange rate system for such a long-time. Once
again, this control did nothing for the poor and added to the country’s already high-
income inequality.
3.2 The budget trap
Currency overvaluation creates a budget trap. About 85 per cent of budget revenues are
in foreign currency reflecting the importance of state revenues from oil. However, most
recurrent expenditures, for example the government wage bill, are in local currency.
Given the country’s high inflation, the state’s nominal expenditures need to grow at a
rate sufficient to match the rising cost of the domestic goods and services bought by the
public sector. Devaluation raises the domestic-currency value of export earnings, and
therefore the kwanza value of their budgetary contribution. By keeping the kwanza
overvalued—as a means of distributing the mineral rents to preferred groups—the
government basically undermined its own solvency. One result was the collapse in real
public-sector wages, and the accumulation of large arrears on salaries and other
payments. In the absence of a domestic capital market, and given difficulties in
accessing foreign capital markets, the fiscal deficit must be monetized—thereby
sustaining high inflation (Aguilar and Stenman 1996).
With an inflation rate well in excess of the world average, the degree of overvaluation
increases over time, thereby maintaining (and increasing) expectations of future
inflation since agents assume (correctly) that devaluation is inevitable and a large
import-price shock will occur. Some private enterprises—mainly of a speculative
nature—thrive under hyperinflation. But generally hyperinflation is highly damaging to
private investment, especially in the informal sector. In the absence of indexed financial
instruments (such as those which cushioned the effects of hyperinflation in Latin
America) and a severely repressed foreign exchange market, only a small group with
privileged access to foreign exchange at the official rate can buy adequate inflation
protection. The poor are therefore hit hard (Aguilar 1992).
In summary, the oil rents are distributed in a manner that perpetuates macro-economic
instability. Domestic purchasing power is rapidly eroded by high inflation, but there are
powerful interests in favour of the status quo and against reform. Hence, the issue of
controlling the fiscal deficit remains unresolved. Additionally, war has imposed a heavy
financial burden on the state, and has exacerbated a critical financial situation. Military
expenditures are quite non-transparent in Angola and no reliable figures are available;
large expenditures are made off-budget (see Addison and Ndikumana 2001). However,
secondary information suggests that the annual direct cost of the war was at least
US$ 500 million over the last decade. Military spending has not only kept the fiscal
deficit high, but it has also limited spending on key social and economic infrastructure
(Adauta et al. 2001).
3.3 The financial sector
After the large shock caused by the currency changeover of 1990, the long process of
reorganization of the financial system began. Today, the financial system consists of the
Banco Nacional de Angola (BNA), with central bank functions, two state-owned banks,
Banco de Poupança e Crédito (BPC) and Banco de Comércio e Industria (BCI), the11
state-owned Caixa de Agricultura e Pescas (CAP) plus three Portuguese private banks,
Banco de Fomento e Exterior, Banco Totta e Açores, and Banco Português do
Atlântico. This mix of private and public banks is in some ways similar to that found in
Ethiopia (see Addison and Alemayehu Geda 2001). The pace of privatization has been
much slower than in Mozambique where private banks have been created out of the old
state banks (see Castel-Branco et al. 2001).
Difficulties and delays in closing its commercial bank activities have hampered BNA’s
focus on its new central bank functions. Moreover, BNA has little (if any) independence
from the government. At times, BNA’s governor has held the rank of minister and has
therefore succumbed to pressure to monetize the fiscal deficit (see section 3). The BNA
takes many of its decisions directly from the president, bypassing the Ministry of
Finance to which it is formally subordinate. The complicated and non-transparent
relationship between BNA, the Ministry of Finance, and SONANGOL has been
repeatedly raised in discussions with the BWIs. The last few years have seen some
improvement in BNA’s technical capacity to focus itself on its central bank functions,
but its ability to regulate the financial sector in the public interest is still open to
question.
The state-owned banks are weak with large portfolios of bad loans and their activities
are subject to minimal regulation. They are slated for eventual privatization but
considerable reorganization and re-capitalization will be necessary. CAP has severe
problems. It provides soft-credits to the private sector (sometimes using donor funds)
and has a very large portfolio of bad loans. CAP was to be wound-up, but periodically
the government resuscitates it with further funding, another controversial issue in the
government’s dialogue with the BWIs. A further shake-up of the CAP was announced
in mid-1999, but it remains to be seen how effective this is.
The legal framework within which to enforce financial obligations is weak and most
transactions are conducted in cash (a large number of scandals, many involving the
state, constrain the use of cheques) and there are periodic liquidity crises when bank
notes become scarce. Limited confidence in the financial system reveals itself in low
levels of bank activity and deposit-savings (the hundred-dollar note remains the most
common instrument for savings). Banks derive most of their profits from international
trade and foreign exchange operations. The capital market is virtually non-existent. The
informal sector has almost no access to formal financial instruments and the lack of
formal credit and savings instruments hinders informal sector investment.
4 Characteristics of the new private sector
By 1990, the formal private sector was exceedingly small, mostly reduced to a few
survivors from colonial times and a few foreign entrepreneurs. But this began to change
with the start of reform. Two factors were especially important. First, private investment
increased after the Bicesse peace agreement and partial demobilization. Former soldiers
entered business using military equipment (such as vehicles), with their demobilization
benefits providing the financial capital. This use of capital acquired during war to
finance ‘post-war’ private investment was also the case in Mozambique (Castel-Branco
et al. 2001 and Wuyts 2001).12
Second, privatization laws were enacted, and small- and medium-sized enterprises
(which were reserved for domestic investors) were privatized. Estimates of how much
privatization yielded for the treasury in the 1990s vary from US$ 6.2 million (World
Bank 2000a) to US$ 25 million (World Bank 2000b) to US$ 80 million. The
privatization process was non-transparent and a reliable figure is not available. A task
force, Gabinete de Redimensionamiento Empresarial (GARE), was set up with donor
support in order to prepare the privatization of large enterprises. A list of 100 large
enterprises slated for privatization or reorganization under continuing state ownership
was prepared in 1994 for implementation over 1995-96, but little has been
accomplished. The privatization process was dubious in many respects. Therefore,
‘insiders’—those with links to the party, the government and the army—acquired
enterprises very cheaply. As in Mozambique, little attention was paid to the interests of
communities who cultivated abandoned state farms when these were privatized (see
Castel-Branco et al. 2001). The process resembled that in the FSU in the way the old
state elite used privatization to acquire wealth. Privatization sometimes amounted to
simple akin to the ‘wild’ privatizations seen in transition countries elsewhere (Addison
2001a). As in the EE-FSU, privatization benefiting insiders is unlikely to yield
efficiency gains, and it is certainly not good for equity (see Stiglitz 1998).
Despite the adverse investment environment (including high communication and
transport costs) there has been substantial foreign investment, particularly in the oil
sector—see Figure 4 (and Le Billon 1999). Projects worth US$ 800 million were
approved over 1990-97; more than half are small projects with an investment level
below US$ 1 million. About 75 per cent of the investment originates in Europe, mainly
Portugal. Foreign investors include West Africans (principally Nigerians) and
investment from South Africa is growing fast. Many investors keep offices open in
Luanda, and foreign investment can be expected to accelerate if peace can be
achieved—as it has done in Mozambique.
Figure 4
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4.1 The few trusted enterprises
The development of Angola’s private sector is constrained by a number of factors:
skilled labour is scarce, infrastructure and services are deficient, and formal financial
services are practically non-existent. But in addition, both production and distribution
are characterized by monopoly and oligopoly, the result of preferential business
licensing, biases in the award of large import contracts by the state, and privileged
access to foreign exchange at the official exchange rate.6 For example, in the retail
trade, one or two large firms typically dominate the import of goods and their wholesale
distribution. A fringe of smaller traders—who compete vigorously among themselves—
depend on these large oligopolies for their supplies.
The oligopolies are known as the Empresarios de confiança (‘the few trusted
enterprises’). They are dominated by a few extended families with roots in the colonial
administration, the independence struggle, and the public service during the socialist
period. They have close connections with the government and the party, and benefit
from their ability to mobilize foreign commercial and political contacts; often the
extended families owning these enterprises have members living permanently in
Portugal or holding dual citizenship. This group’s influence is such that even a change
of government would probably cause only a minor alteration in its composition. They
have a strong lobby, known as AIA (Associaçäo Industrial de Angola), which favours
protectionism and is generally hostile to reform.
The oligopolies emerged partly as a result of the state’s intention to hold ‘strategic
reserves’ of basic goods in order to maintain adequate supplies, especially in the
provinces (an objective that was never in fact met). Import of such goods on behalf of
the Ministry of Commerce and the local governments was handed over to the
Empresarios de confiança on the grounds that other private-sector participants were
excessively orientated to speculation and this would achieve an equitable distribution of
the goods without ‘speculative’ profits. They are also prominent in trade with the oil
sector, especially through SONANGOL.
The informal private sector grew rapidly in the 1990s to account for the largest share of
the workforce; the contraction of agriculture, massive internal migration, the
demobilization of the army, and post-1990 liberalization all contributed to its expansion.
The informal sector is presently a survival strategy for many but it could be a major
source of employment growth, including livelihoods for demobilized soldiers, if peace
can be secured. However, informal entrepreneurs are constrained by the activities of the
Empresarios de confiança. The latter dominate the wholesale market and can dictate
prices to informal retailers, therefore keeping their profits low and limiting informal-
sector growth. Moreover, informal entrepreneurs have little access to financial services
and they operate in an uncertain legal environment; government tends to see street
vendors as a social menace and they are often the targets of police action. In addition,
the uncertain macro-economic environment negatively affects the informal sector.
6 In recent years it has been possible to import using ‘non-budgeted resources’, a euphemism which
denotes foreign currency bought in the open market, the supply of which includes foreign currency
that has leaked from oil-export earnings and, most probably, from UNITA’s illegal diamond
operations.14
Transaction costs are high given the weak—and sometimes non-existent capacity—of
the state to enforce contracts. Hence, the Portuguese and African traditions of the
extended family are very important for business success in this environment. These
networks provide information flows as well as mechanisms of contract enforcement and
an internal capital market—thereby partially overcoming the weakness of the legal,
regulatory, and financial frameworks. Although these informal networks have enabled
entrepreneurs to take advantage of the economy’s gradual liberalization, private sector
development—particularly among small and medium-size enterprises—would
accelerate if the state started to invest in supporting institutions. Therefore, as in the
FSU itself, the development of appropriate institutional frameworks is urgently needed.
However, at present the Empresarios de confiança are closely connected to state actors
(again a parallel with Eastern Europe and the FSU) enabling them to bypass institutional
impediments that block the development of the rest of the private sector. Hence, they
have little interest in pressing for institutional reforms that would facilitate the entry of
potential competitors.
5 Conclusions
War has certainly damaged the development of Angola’s private sector by disrupting
markets, changing the allocation of resources in arbitrary ways, and creating high levels
of uncertainty. Peace, if it can ever be secured, would provide many profitable
opportunities for domestic and foreign investment, both of which have surged in
Mozambique. The oil sector, which is today only weakly linked to the rest of the
economy, could develop many more profitable backward and forward linkages thereby
creating the employment growth that Angolans desperately need.
But war is not the only factor hindering (and distorting) private-sector development.
Macro-economic instability—in particular the persistence of high inflation—has also
undermined the growth of private investment, especially in the production sectors which
are most likely to generate employment growth. High inflation is in part due to the war,
but it also reflects the hesitant character of Angola’s economic transition from state
socialism. In particular, the design and implementation of macro-economic policy has
been haphazard, reflecting severe institutional weakness and opposition by powerful
vested interests. Reform’s opponents have used the war as an excuse to delay much-
needed policy change. Angola’s experience therefore stands in strong contrast to that of
Mozambique, which began extensive reforms during the war itself. Although there are
legitimate disagreements about the design and implementation of reform—the
sequencing of reforms in the financial-sector in particular—the economy will not
deliver poverty-reducing growth until economic transition is achieved and unless it is
accompanied by large-scale investment in the capabilities of Angola’s poor.15
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